LBO LITIGATION, FINANCIAL PROJECTIONS
AND THE CHAPTER 11 PLAN PROCESS
By Richard Lieb and RobertJ. Feinstein*
I.

A.

INTRODUCTION

LBOs and the Rehabilitative Goal of Bankruptcy

The bankruptcy law is fundamentally rehabilitative in its object.' Congress and the courts have traditionally shaped the
bankruptcy law to provide a "fresh start" for honest debtors who2
suffer financial reverses in their business or personal affairs.
The commencement of a bankruptcy case automatically provides
instant relief for debtors,' and in a chapter 11 case the confirma* Richard Lieb and Robert J. Feinstein are partners in the New York City law
firm of Kronish, Lieb, Weiner & Hellman. Mr. Lieb is also an instructor at the
Legal Education Institute of the United States Department ofJustice, Washington,
D.C. and teaches chapter 11 at the Institute's school for federal attorneys.
I See Klee, Timbers, Ahlers and Beyond, ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 1, 10 (1989)(discuss-

ing purpose of chapter 11 proceeding); see also Broude, Cramdown and Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code: The Settlement Imperative, 39 Bus. LAw. 441, 442 (1984) (analysis
of the effects of cramdown in confirming a plan of reorganization).
2 See, e.g., Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459 (1913) (holding that under
§ 70(a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 life insurance policies with no cash surrender
value remain property of bankrupt); Compass Inv. Group v. Maidman (In re
Maidman), 668 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1982) (applying Bankruptcy Act of 1898 to land
trusts).
3 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988). Bankruptcy Code § 362(a) provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition
filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed
under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970
(15 U.S.C. § 78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities,
of(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance
or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been
commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or
to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of
the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the
case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of
property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the
estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property
of the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the
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tion of a plan of reorganization discharges the debtor's debts not
preserved by the plan, and provides a new opportunity for success of the enterprise.4
The chapter 11 reorganization process is designed to preserve an enterprise based on a realistic plan for the future operation of the debtor's business, and the post-confirmation payment
of its reorganized debt. A feasible reorganization avoids the alternative of liquidation, which would most likely return less to
creditors and equity security holders than they would receive in a
reorganization. Because the reorganization of a company preserves jobs for its employees and the rehabilitated company continues to purchase goods and services, a reorganization also
enhances the local and national economy and promotes the public good. Consequently, public policy favors bankruptcy
reorganization.
debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor
that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before
the commencement of the case under this title against any claim
against the debtor; and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before
the United States Tax Court concerning the debtor.
Id.
4

See id. at § 1141(d); Code section 1141(d) provides:
(d)(1) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, in the
plan, or in the order confirming the plan, the confirmation of a plan(A) discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before the
date of such confirmation, and any debt of a kind specified in section
5 0 2(g), 502(h), or 502(i) of this title, whether or not(i) a proof of the claim based on such debt is filed or deemed
filed under section 501 of this title;
(ii) such claim is allowed under section 502 of this title; or
(iii) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan; and
(B) terminates all rights and interests of equity security holders
and general partners provided for by the plan.
(2) The confirmation of a plan does not discharge an individual
debtor from any debt excepted from discharge under section 523 of
this title.
(3) The confirmation of a plan does not discharge a debtor if(A) the plan provides for the liquidation of all or substantially all
of the property of the estate;
(B) the debtor does not engage in business after consummation
of the plan; and
(C) the debtor would be denied a discharge under section 727(a)
of this title if the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title.
(4) The court may approve a written waiver of discharge executed by the debtor after the order for relief under this chapter.
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The historic perception that seeking bankruptcy relief is immoral has given way to the current view that bankruptcy is an
essential and significant tool for business debtors. Bankruptcy is
being used by some of America's largest corporations. The
Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (the Code) heralded the notion that
bankruptcy is designed to provide relief for, rather than stigmatize, those who invoke its provisions. The very language of the
Code, which automatically grants "an order for relief" upon the
voluntary commencement of a bankruptcy case, instead of an
"adjudication in bankruptcy" dictated by the former Bankruptcy
Act,6 ushered in the current era in which seeking relief in bankruptcy is acceptable to the business community.
Rehabilitation is a prime goal of chapter 11, but not its only
goal. The bankruptcy law is the engine that drives the process for
ferreting out financial wrongdoing that has injured creditors and
shareholders. Financial excesses, mismanagement, negligence,
fraud, or other causes of a debtor's failure are investigated and
the facts reported to the interested parties and the public.7 The
bankruptcy court is then available as a forum in which legal liability may be imposed on the responsible parties,' and remedies
provided to injured creditors and shareholders. In a sense, the
bankruptcy law is the conscience of the business community; it
brings the judicial microscope to bear on the business organization that has failed and imposes liability on those whose wrongdoing was responsible for the failure.
5 Id. at § 301.

6 Former II U.S.C. § 1(2) defined "adjudication" to mean a determination that
a person is a "bankrupt". 11 U.S.C. § 1(2) (1976).
7 In a chapter 11 case, if the court does not order the appointment of a chapter
11 trustee pursuant to § 1104 of the Code, the court is required, upon a request of
the party in interest or the United States trustee, to order the appointment of an
examiner to conduct an investigation of the debtor if "the debtor's fixed, liquidated, unsecured debts, other than debts for goods, services, or taxes, or owing to
an insider, exceed $5 million." 11 U.S.C. § 1104(b) (1988). It has been held that if
such debts exceed the $5 million threshold, the appointment of an examiner is
mandatory. In re Revco D.S., Inc., 898 F.2d 498, 500-01 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing 11
U.S.C. § 1104(b) (1979 & Supp. 1989)). Under § 1104(c), the United States
trustee, following the making of such court order, appoints the examiner after consultation with parties in interest, subject to approval of the court. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1104(c) (1988). The examiner's statement of his investigation is filed, as required
by § 1106(a)(4)(A) and § 1106(b) of the Code. Id. at § 1106(a)(4)(A), § 1106(b).
Upon filing, such statement becomes a public record open to examination by every
entity at reasonable times without charge, as provided by § 107 of the Code. Id. at

§ 107.

8 This is made possible through, for example, the avoiding powers provided by

§§ 544-548 of the Code, id. at §§ 544-548, and the provisions for the disallowance
of claims pursuant to § 502(b) of the Code, id. at § 502(b).

1991]

THE CHAPTER II PLAN PROCESS

601

The proliferation of business bankruptcy filings in 19909 is
reflective in large part of the availability of unrestricted credit to
fund huge leveraged buyout transactions (LBOs), and the
voracious appetite of business managers and investment bankers
for squeezing enormous short term profits out of otherwise
healthy businesses unable to shoulder the debt imposed on them
in these transactions. Indeed, the growth in the number of LBOs
was massive during the 1980s. Since 1981, when the aggregate
value of LBOs was about three billion dollars in America, such
transactions increased to an aggregate value of over forty-two billion dollars in 1988.10 The risks of "leveraging", however, were
brought into sharp focus by a number of events in the late 1980s,
including a stock market crash in 1987, the collapse of the "junk
bond" market, and the downfall of Drexel, Burnham & Company
which ultimately filed for bankruptcy in 1990, and the rippling
effect of the savings and loan fiasco.
A common reason for the bankruptcy of many large corporations today was the overleveraging of their assets rather than a
failure of their business operations. Excessive debt burdens were
heaped on healthy businesses during the 1980s in LBOs. Now
that so many companies, including some household names, are in
chapter 11, LBOs have fallen into disfavor and recoupment of
large losses is being sought from those who caused them. For
example, a member of the House Judiciary Committee stated at a
hearing held on March 1, 1990 examining the causes for the failure of Drexel, Burnham, which had a leading position in financing LBOs with "junk bond" issues:
Mr. Speaker, in the days of the Old West the robbers
would ride out of town - saddlebags bulging with stolen
money - just before the posse rode into town.
We had another wild west adventure the other day, Mr.
Speaker [referring to Drexel's payment of bonuses to executives shortly before its bankruptcy filing].
Only this time the bad guys did not wear red bandannas
and buckskin vests. They wore Hermes ties and Saville Row
suits.
9 The number of chapter 11 filings increased to 19,591 in 1990 from 7,828 in
BANKR. CT. DECISIONS, WEEKLY NEWS AND COMMENT, Issue 20, A3,

1981; see 20

November 15, 1990.
10 See Cieri, Heiman, HenzeJenks, Kirschner, Riley & Sullivan, An Introduction to
Legal and PracticalConsiderations in the Restructuring of Troubled Leveraged Buyouts, 45
Bus. LAW. 333, 333-34 (1989).
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This time they didn't ride out of town on horses but on
BMW's and Rolls Royces.
I hope we can change the bankruptcy code to give trustees
added authority to go behind fraudulent transfers of corporate
wealth designed to defeat legitimate claims of creditors and
rank and file employees.
Mr. Speaker, I want to rewrite that old West scenario. I
want the posse to ride into town before the bad guys ride
out. ''
That is not to say that using junk bonds or other debt instruments to finance large LBOs is necessarily illegal or unethical. At
the same Congressional hearing on March 1, 1990, Alan Greenspan,
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board,
testified that some junk bond financing serves valid business objectives.' 2 Junk bonds are an obvious and potentially valuable source
of venture capital. It would thus be counterproductive to the national economy to legislate junk bonds out of existence. The better
alternative is to recognize of the abuses and excesses of the 1980s,
and a return to fundamental financial yardsticks rather than excessive leveraging predicated on overly optimistic projections of future
revenue and expense, which contain no leeway or margin for error
and lack a reasonable relation to historical performance. A leveraged buyout transaction using junk bond financing may be sound if
it is predicated on reliable business forecasts and supported by rational assumptions about the particular company and the industry in
which it operates.

B.

Nature of an LBO

In a typical large LBO transaction, the "target" company, in
addition to its existing debts, assumes massive new debt obligations to Institutional lenders and the purchasers of publicly issued debt securities, which advance the funds used to acquire all
of the target's outstanding common stock from the old stockholders, usually at a premium. The assets of the target company
are pledged as security for some or all of the LBO loans and the
new group that acquires ownership of the equity in the target
makes a relatively small investment.
In a typical LBO the target company gets no benefit from the
11 136 CONG. REC. H432 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1990) (statement of Cong. Mazzoli).
12 136 CONG. REC. H432 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1990) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board).
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transaction. The massive funds, generated by the debt it assumes
and the security interests it creates in its assets in favor of the
lender, are used to pay the old stockholders. Not only is there no
benefit to the target company, but an LBO often weakens it by
the imposition of a huge debt burden. If the target company can
shoulder the new debt, the LBO may turn out to be a success for
the promoters of the transaction and the new equity owners, in
addition to the former shareholders who receive premium prices
for their shares. If the enterprise fails, however, the target company will find itself in a chapter 11 proceeding in which the LBO
transaction may be examined under applicable law, to determine
whether the target company either became insolvent or was left
so financially weak as a result of the LBO as to justify unwinding
the transaction or otherwise restoring to the target company or
others injured by the LBO the fruits gained by the promoters and
others who profited from it.

C.

The Role of Projections

LBO transactions in the 1980s were typically predicated on
the basis of projections of future available cash at levels sufficient
to service the enormous debt obligations imposed on the target
company. These projections were used to induce investors and
lenders to invest the cash required to pay out the old stockholders and to pay the fees incurred in the transaction. As expected,
if the projections of future revenues predicted to be available to
pay operating costs of the business and to repay the LBO obligations turned out to be wrong, the LBO target would run out of
cash and the LBO would fail under the weight of the debt burden
imposed on it; the target would be saddled with debt from which
it received no benefit.
The reliability of financial projections is dependent on the
accuracy and completeness of the assumptions upon which they
are predicated. Consequently, a prediction that a company will
have sufficient future cash to meet its debt service obligations
may turn out to be wrong if a material assumption was incorrect
or a significant fact was not considered or reflected. If a cash
projection was incorrect, it may later be found that the LBO left
the company without sufficient capital. Such a finding could lead
to a ruling that the LBO involved a fraudulent conveyance or a
violation of a corporation law restricting the payment of dividends or other distributions to shareholders.

604
D.

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 21:598

LBOs in the Bankruptcy Courts

Federal bankruptcy law'" and state laws, including state
debtor/creditor, corporation and tort laws, may be invoked by
injured creditors and shareholders to challenge the validity of the
original LBO transaction and hold those legally responsible for
their losses. The bankruptcy process under the Code brings to
bear the legal and equitable concepts by which failed LBOs are
tested and the rights of injured parties vindicated. While the
bankruptcy laws are designed to rehabilitate business debtors,
they also serve to correct abuses and to provide a remedy to
those who have suffered financial losses despite the protections
afforded by the disclosure and anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws. The bankruptcy process is the conscience of the financial community and the means for the articulation of timehonored ethical principles that call for fair dealing by the promoters of business transactions' 4 and those in a position of trust
by reason of their roles in structuring them.
Key actors in LBO transactions often wear two hats: corporate directors voting for the LBO and leaders of the new ownership group, financial advisors and underwriters of LBO debt
securities, or the preparers of projections for the LBO offering
and the recipients of huge contingent fees payable if the LBO is
completed. While such conflicts were often disclosed in the LBO
offering material, a long line of authority stands for the proposition that disclosure of a conflict of interest by a professional may
not alone be sufficient to cure the conflict and justify serving conflicting interests.' 5 It is well settled that fiduciaries and others in
a position of trust cannot occupy a conflicting position with impunity and must deal fairly with those who have a right to rely
11 U.S.C. § 544, § 548 (1988).
See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928) (holding that
coadventurers managing leased property were subject to fiduciary duties and owed
the duty of finest loyalty to each other).
15 See, e.g., In re BH&P, Inc., 119 Bankr. 35, 42 (D.N.J. 1990) (acting as trustee
for two bankruptcy estates and for one of their creditors, which was another bankruptcy estate, constituted an impermissible conflict of interest in violation of 11
U.S.C. § 101(13)(E), and § 701(a)(l) (1988)); In re Kendavis Indus. Int'l, Inc., 91
Bankr. 742, 754 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) (attorney for debtor corporation who
makes agreement with shareholder, director or management of the debtor, or with
some control party, to protect that party's interest, has an actual conflict of interest
and may be disqualified and disallowed fees under 11 U.S.C. § 327 (1988)); In re
Roberts, 75 Bankr. 402, 405-07 (Bankr. D. Utah 1987) (law firm that is prepetition
creditor is disqualified from representing chapter 11 debtor in possession under 11
U.S.C. § 101(13) and § 327(a)).
13

14
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upon them.16 When an LBO fails and ends up in a bankruptcy
court, it is likely that the LBO transaction will be examined and
those responsible for its failure held accountable to the injured
parties.
The process for investigation and determination of both liability and the remedy is complex in a bankruptcy case. Because
of the protracted and contested character of the investigative and
adjudicatory bankruptcy process, it can be expected that in many
cases the imperative for negotiating a settlement of the disputes
arising out of the LBO will prevail. Those who have suffered
losses may resolve their claims against potentially responsible
parties through negotiation and settlement rather than by litigating to final judgment.
While settlement may often be the wiser course, a litigation
advantage may be sought by either side, serving to delay the
commencement of settlement negotiations and complicate the
chapter 11 process. Claims arising out of a failed LBO may be
addressed in pre-bankruptcy litigation or negotiations as well as
in the context of a bankruptcy case in which the failed LBO company is the chapter 11 debtor. The difficulty entailed in the resolution of such a controversy in the pre-petition setting is perhaps
greater than within the framework of a bankruptcy case itself because, unlike the more formalized chapter 11, the pre-petition
dialogue lacks a formal structure to encourage a negotiated
settlement.
This article will explore post-bankruptcy problems posed by
a failed LBO transaction including an examination of claims arising from an LBO that may be available in the chapter 11 context,
the legal standard applied to evaluate the reasonableness of financial projections which underpinned the LBO, and the
processes for the assertion and resolution of LBO claims after
the target becomes a chapter 11 debtor.
II.

A.

FINANCIAL PROJECTIONS UNDER THE JUDICIAL MICROSCOPE

Introduction

In order to determine whether a debtor has viable legal
claims arising out of an LBO, an important threshold inquiry is
16 See Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 271 (1951) (holding reorganization
trustee liable for profits earned by his assistants when they traded in securities of
debtor's subsidiaries); Woods v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust, 312 U.S. 262, 268 (1941)
(holding that compensation should be denied a claimant who was subject to conflicting interests when representing members of the investing public).
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whether the projections, used by the issuers and underwriters to
sell the debt and equity securities issued to public and private
investors to fund the LBO, were formulated in accordance with
the applicable legal standards. These forecasts are essential in
both structuring LBO transactions and in obtaining the funds required for their consummation. If the projections of future revenue, other sources of cash, or expenses were unsound, then the
corporation very well could have been left with insufficient capital in light of its business needs. That is a key inquiry in a fraudulent conveyance analysis. Legal liability may be incurred by those
who were responsible for preparing and evaluating erroneous
projections, including the LBO target's management and the financial advisors to the target or to the buyout group.
B.

Financial Projections and the Roles of the FinancialAdvisor

Forecasts are prepared by issuers, sometimes alone, and
sometimes in conjunction with outside financial advisors. The issuer's financial advisor may perform two different functions in
connection with a particular proposed transaction. The advisor
may provide guidance on the structure and soundness of the proposed LBO transaction and also perform a concurrent underwriting function involving the sale and distribution of the securities
that generate the funds needed to consummate the transaction.
In some instances, outside financial advisors, if only because of
their own expertise, occupy a dominant role in the preparation of
financial projections, including the determination of the assumptions that serve as the foundation for the projections. Financial
advisors earn significant fees for these services, which may be
contingent on the consummation of the transaction. They thus
have a vested interest in the successful completion of the proposed transaction.
By their nature, projections of future performance of the
business and its available cash cannot have a higher quality than
the assumptions upon which they were predicated. Despite the
care with which experienced personnel may prepare projections,
they sometimes turn out to be wrong. The reliability of projections may be affected by the inherent difficulty of estimating future revenue and income with a high degree of mathematical
certainty. In some instances, unfortunately, the projections turn
out to be wrong because the assumptions did not comport with
historic performance or a rational perception of conditions which
might occur in the future. Moreover, when financial advisors
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sometimes accept the assumptions provided by the target's management without independent verification and testing, their theory may be that it is management's function to construct the
assumptions and the financial advisors's function to create the
financial structure of the LBO on the basis of the values derived
from the projections produced by management.
The experience of the 1980s and the recent failure of many
of the highly leveraged transactions generated during that decade provide substantial evidence that many LBOs were based on
faulty assumptions. The securities laws may not have been adequate to warn potential investors of the risk factors they faced.
Boiler plate disclaimers may not have provided an adequate
warning that projections are merely predictions of the future,
that their underlying assumptions may have been unfounded,
and that the projections may prove to be wrong.
C. Projections Take on a Life of Their Own
The temptation of participants in an LBO to place heavy reliance on projections is understandable. The consummation of
any business transaction usually involves consideration of what
will happen to the business and what its cash resources will be in
the future. Financial projections are the principal means for evaluating the future.
Projections tend to take on a life and reality of their own.
They are usually reflected in sophisticated computer runs and
models which are packaged in neat booklets and carry the endorsement of the senior management of the target company and
well-respected investment banking and accounting firms. The
physical attractiveness of the presentation and the professional
endorsements of the quality of the projections, however, should
not blur the fact that by their nature projections are merely opinions as to what may happen in the future, rather than reality, and
that projections can be no stronger than the accuracy and completeness of the assumptions upon which they are predicated.
Accordingly, when projections upon which an LBO was premised
are challenged in litigation, they should not have the benefit of a
presumption of correctness. The assumptions underling projections are scrutinized in the ensuing litigation for accuracy and
adequacy as well as for their reasonableness.
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D.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:598

The Legal Test Applied to Determine the Adequacy of Projections
and Their Underlying Assumptions

When an LBO target becomes a chapter 11 debtor, an examination of the projection involves a bipartite inquiry. First, were
the assumptions underlying the projections fairly made, and
grounded on the prior and current experience of both the company and other companies in the same field of business in which
the company engaged? Second, was there a failure to factor into
the projections all of the risks or other circumstances that had a
foreseeable impact on the future revenue and income of the
enterprise?
Honesty of purpose and "good faith" on the part of the financial personnel who prepared the projections are not necessarily relevant to whether the projections were accurate or incorrect
predictions of future revenue and income. Projections turn out
either to be correct or incorrect. Only to the extent that projections and underlying assumptions may also involve an element of
judgment are honesty of purpose and freedom from conflict of
interest relevant to whether liability should be imposed after projections turn out to be wrong.
1. In General
At the heart of the post-bankruptcy examination of an LBO
is the testing of the adequacy of the financial projections of revenues and cash flows used as the basis for fixing the financial
terms of the LBO. Projections of future cash resources are the
principal tools used by corporate managers and outside financial
advisors and investment bankers to determine the amount and
repayment terms of the debts incurred by the target company in
an LBO. The amount paid to the shareholders of the target company for their shares is also a direct function of the amount borrowed, the interest rate and the terms of repayment. If the
projections are accurate, the target company should have sufficient capital and be able to meet its new debt burden. If the projections are wrong and there is insufficient margin for error, the
enterprise may eventually fail; if it subsequently cannot obtain
fresh financing or cash from other sources, it will end up in
bankruptcy.
When an LBO investment is under consideration, investors
expect that, based on the projections produced by the business
and financial professionals, the target company will be able to
shoulder its new debt burden. If the advice given by corporate
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managers and financial advisors turns out to be wrong but was
supported by logical underpinnings, one might assume that
those who structured the transaction and provided the financial
guidance with honesty of purpose should sustain no legal liability
for the losses suffered even though the projections turned out to
be inaccurate.
As taught many years ago by a pre-eminent jurist: "The life
of the law has not been logic; it has been experience."' 7 While
logic is an important ingredient of reliable projections, they must
also reflect experience. If any significant assumption on which a
projection is based is either erroneous or fails to reflect financial
or human experience, the resulting 'prediction that there will be
sufficient cash available to service the debt in future years will
likely turn out to be unreliable. Indeed, despite the logic employed in the preparation of projections, the lack of correct or
complete assumptions dictated by historic performance of the
enterprise may cause the projections to be inaccurate.
In a typical case of a failed LBO, the target had historical or
pre-LBO earnings below the earnings projected for future years
as the basis for estimating the amount of debt the company could
carry. Projections that are not consistent with historical income
may for that reason fail the legal test for their acceptability. In In
re Keeshin Freight Lines, Inc. 18 the future earnings projections of an
LBO target predicted earnings that were consistent with the
amount earned during the company's two best earlier years, but
not with a number of other prior years in which the earnings
were substantially less. The court ruled that taking historical
earnings into account was important in formulating a prediction
for the future. The court stated:
It appears that 1941 and 1948 were, therefore, unusual
years, involving circumstances which were distinctly out of the
ordinary, and there is no proof that the circumstances under
which those earnings were produced were ever repeated during the other past years of the company's history. However,
even if 1941 and 1948 were not abnormal years, it was errone-

ous on the part of the witness to single out the two years of
highest earnings and rely exclusively on them in estimating future earnings expectancies. The record does not disclose any
logical reason why only the two highest years should have
been used. Certainly, a more proper and reliable estimate of
future earnings expectancies that can reasonably be expected
17 O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw
18 86 F. Supp. 439 (N.D. Ill.
1949).

1 (1881).
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to be produced would have been to take into consideration all
of the other years in the company's past history.
It is proper to examine the past earnings history of a business in considering whether or not a future earnings estimate
is reasonable. The federal courts have recognized the desirability of taking a number of years of past earnings into consideration in arriving at a reasonable estimate of future earnings
capacity of an enterprise. In [a Second Circuit case] the court,
through Judge Learned Hand, approved of taking either five
or eleven years. In [a Michigan District Court case] a fifteenyear period was approved.'
A projection based on a misleading predicate will thus fail the
legal test for acceptability. Of course, projections may be unreliable
for a variety of other reasons, including a failure to take into account
certain risks that may later come to pass, or the failure to properly
analyze the company's core business or how the company fits in the
market in which it engaged in business.
2.

Certain Bankruptcy Code Provisions

Financial projections perform a significant function in applying various provisions of the Code. Financial projections of future revenue and other cash resources of the debtor are
uniformly found in disclosure statements transmitted to the creditor and shareholder electorate whose votes on a proposed chapter 11 plan of reorganization are solicited pursuant to section
1125(b) of the Code.20 Although section 1125(b) expressly permits a court to approve a disclosure statement without a valuation of the debtor or an appraisal of its assets, information as to
future income is usually necessary to provide "adequate information" as required by section 11251 Such information is required for the creditors to make an informed judgment as to
whether the future payments promised to them under the proposed plan of reorganization are realistic commitments or the
product of merely speculative promises or empty hopes.
Projections of future revenue are also usually placed in evidence at the section 112822 hearing on confirmation in order to
satisfy the "feasibility" requirement for confirmation contained
19 In re Keeshin, 86 F. Supp. at 443 (citing Dudley v. Mealey, 147 F.2d 268 (2d
Cir. 1945); In re Barium Realty Co., 62 F. Supp. 81 (D.C. Mich. 1945)).
20 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (1988).
21 Id. at § 1125(a).
22 Id. at § 1128.
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in section 1129(a)(11) of the Code.2" Under that provision, a
proposed plan of reorganization cannot be confirmed unless the
court finds that confirmation of the plan "is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor.

*"24

Projections of future cash

resources are thus necessary to establish that the debtor will have
the means to perform its commitments under the proposed plan
of reorganization to make the promised future payments rather
than to default and find itself in need of debtor relief once again.
Despite the importance and frequent inclusion of financial
projections in disclosure statements, and their introduction into
evidence at confirmation hearings, there is a surprising dearth of
case law establishing the legal standard governing the preparation of a financial projection.25 Instead, the reported cases deal
primarily with whether a debtor has established by sufficient evidence the feasibility of its proposed plan of reorganization. Feasibility requires proof of sufficient sources of cash, including
future earnings, or a realistic program for the disposition of assets not required for the debtor's ongoing business operations.
The cases principally reflect the courts' analysis of whether the
projections introduced into evidence at a confirmation hearing
were credible or unreliable as "speculative, conjectural or unrealistic predictions." 2 6 Projections should be compatible with the
company's historical financial performance, including its recent
progress or lack of progress during the pendency of the chapter
11 case. As viewed by some courts, the debtor's post-petition
Id. at § 1129(a)(11).
Id.
The function of a chief financial officer in preparing a firm projection has
been described as follows:
The chief financial officer should be required to conclude that
Target will not incur debts beyond its ability to pay as they mature
based on projected financial statements which demonstrate that Target will have positive cash flow after paying all of its scheduled anticipated indebtedness. He or she should further conclude that the
realization of current assets in the ordinary course of business in addition to the proceeds of contemplated sales of assets not necessary for
the continuation of Target's business will be sufficient to pay recurring current debt, short-term debt, and long-term debt service as such
debts mature, and that the cash flow of Target and such asset sale
proceeds will be sufficient to provide cash necessary to repay longterm indebtedness as such debt matures or that it is reasonably anticipated that long-term debt can be readily refinanced at its maturity.
Kirby, McGuinness & Kandel, FraudulentConveyance Concerns in Leveraged Buyout Lending, 43 Bus. L.Aw. 27, 47 (1987).
26 In re Merrimack Valley Oil Co., 32 Bankr. 485, 488 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983).
23

24
25
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performance may itself be viewed as one indicator of the debtor's
fate.27
In In re Lakeside Global II, Ltd.,28 the court refused to give
credence to the debtor's projections of future income and expenses of its apartment property and rejected confirmation of its
proposed plan which would have "crammed down" the mortgage
holders. 29 The court concluded that it was unlikely the mortgagees would receive, under the plan, the present value of their
interest in the property in light of the then prevailing economic
conditions. Under the plan proposed by the debtor, only minimal interest payments were to be made from the projected net
operating income available after payment of all operating costs;
the interest rate proposed for the reorganized mortgage debt was
a below market rate and, in the earlier post-confirmation years,
even below the contract rate provided by the mortgages. The
premise of the debtor's proposed plan was an assumption that
there would be a significant increase in the value and marketability of its properties beginning two years after confirmation, which
was the plan's theory for deferring the commencement of substantial distributions to the mortgage holders until several years
hence, when a future sale of or refinancing of the property could
take place.
In denying confirmation, the court in Lakeside Global enunciated the following basic principle: "When the financial realities
do not support the projections or where the proponents' projections are unreasonable, the plan should not be confirmed." '
The plan proposed in that case was not feasible because the
amount of cash flow projected to commence in two years was not
enough for the scheduled payments. Nor was there a reasonable
basis on which to predict that the property could then be sold
because a future buyer was not yet known or sure to come on the
scene. With respect to the projection of cash, the court observed
that the financial history of the debtor's properties cast doubt on
the accuracy of the aggressive projections it offered to prove the
27 In Merrimack Valley Oil Co., 32 Bankr. at 488, the court stated that "[w]here a

debtor proposes to fund a plan out of operating revenue, its financial record during
the pendency of the Chapter 11 is probative of feasibility." Id.

(citing In re North-

ern Protective Servs., Inc., 19 Bankr. 802 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1982); In re Western
Management, Inc., 6 Bankr. 438 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1980)).

28 116 Bankr. 499 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989).
29 See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text for a description of the Code's
cramdown provisions.
30 In re Lakeside, 116 Bankr. at 507-08.
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feasibility of its proposed plan. Specifically, the court recognized
that the debtor's income for the last two years before the hearing
on confirmation was less than it projected for the future and that
its expenses exceeded the budgeted projections. Neither was the
court satisfied that there was a reasonable basis upon which to
conclude that there would be a significant increase in the value
and marketability of the properties two years hence. As stated by
the court in Lakeside Global:
The court is not reasonably convinced that the market will
so dramatically improve that it is legally proper to keep the
lienholders in suspense while the investors bide for time. This
court has consistently critically analyzed projections by experts
testifying on behalf of hopeful plan proponents who represent
that the market will improve such as to provide the realty with
3
values in excess of the liens and far above current estimates. 1
In rejecting the projections offered by the debtor, the court in
Lakeside Global declined to follow the testimony of the debtor's expert witness, who stated that "rental rates are likely to more than
double in the next three to six years." 2 The court refused to accept
projections of this type that lacked historical foundation or other
basis for a predicted future improvement in the occupancy rate of
the property in question, especially where there was no evidence
that the particular properties were better than others in the area and
there were no present offers to purchase the properties. As stated
by the court, "[w]hile all speculations are just that, predictions on
performance must be met with objective fact and judged in that
light."'3' The court's approach in Lakeside Global in essence rejected
speculation offered by an expert witness as to improvement in operating results and property values in the future, unsupported by present facts and unjustified by historical performance and values. A
mere hope for the future is not a sufficient predicate for a
projection.

3.

Consolidated Rock Products v. Dubois

Projections are also important in the context of applying the
"cramdown" provisions contained in section 1129(b) of the
Code.3 4 These provisions authorize a court to confirm a plan of
reorganization despite the negative vote of a class of claims or
31l Id. at 508.
32

Id. at 509.

33 Id. at 510.
34 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1988).
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equity interests if the plan "does not discriminate unfairly"
against the dissenting class and is "fair and equitable" with respect to the dissenting class.3 5 If the debtor is insolvent, the
bankruptcy law views the equity interest as having no value.
Under section 1129(b) of the Code, the equity interests may then
be extinguished by a "cram down" plan of reorganization over
the objection of the class whose members' stock interests are to
be extinguished. The value of the debtor enterprise for this purpose may be demonstrated by its projected earning capacity.
Although financial projections are at the heart of such determination, the case law under the Code does not provide a concrete
legal standard for evaluating the acceptability of particular financial projections.
The principles enunciated fifty years ago in ConsolidatedRock
Products v. DuBois36 continue to be the most articulate pronouncement of the legal standard that a projection must satisfy. The
Supreme Court's 1941 decision in Consolidated Rock Products best

articulates in the bankruptcy law context the legal test which a
projection must pass. In that case, the issue was whether the provisions of a plan of reorganization for a parent corporation and
two wholly-owned subsidiaries were fair to various bondholder
constituencies whose claims had different levels of seniority, and
thus in compliance with the corporate reorganization provisions
contained in section 77B of the former Bankruptcy Act. The
Court concluded that the plan of reorganization was unfair.
Under the "rule of absolute priority," derived from the original
reorganization statutes as amplified in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber
Products Co., Ltd. ,38 it was essential to determine the future earnings capacity of the enterprise in deciding whether a particular
plan of reorganization's provisions for junior securities were supported by the reorganization value of the debtor.
In Consolidated Rock Products, the Court ruled that the com-

mercial value of an enterprise is a function of "the expectation of
income from it," as spelled out by Mr. Justice Holmes in Galveston, Harrisburgand San Antonio Railway Co. v. Texas.39 As more recently stated in In re Equity Funding Corp. of America,40 a projected
35 Id.

312 U.S. 510 (1941).
Section 77B enacted June 7, 1934 as part of the former Bankruptcy Act.
308 U.S. 106 (1939).
39 ConsolidatedRock Products, 312 U.S. at 526 (quoting Galveston, Harrisburg and
San Antonio Ry. v. Texas, 210 U.S. 217, 226 (1908)).
40 391 F. Supp. 768 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
36

37
38
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stream of future income has a discounted present value that takes
into account an interest factor that reflects both the time value of
money and the possibility that the projected income may not be
realized. The discounted present value of the projected income
is what is known as the "reorganization" or "enterprise" value of
the debtor. In a chapter 11 case, the plan of reorganization provides for the issuance or retention of debt instruments and equity
securities based upon the plan's allocation of the "enterprise"
value among the creditor and shareholder classes. The discount
rate used to determine the present value of the future income
stream is a function of the rate of return investors would require
for the risk of the type involved. The discount rate is the subject
of expert opinion and determination by the court. 4 The legal
standard governing the appropriate discount rate is that it should
be the interest rate that is reasonable in light of the risk
involved.4 2
An evaluation of earning capacity is thus essential for a fair
and equitable allocation of the securities of the reorganized entity among the various classes of claimants and shareholders. As
stated by Justice Douglas in Consolidated Rock Products:
The criterion of earning capacity ... requires a prediction

as to what will occur in the future, an estimate, as distinguished from mathematical certitude, is all that can be made.
But that estimate must be based on an informed judgment
which embraces all facts relevant to future earning capacity
and hence to present worth, including, of course, the nature
and condition of the properties, the past earnings record, and
all circumstances that indicate whether or not that record is a
reliable criterion of future performance.4 3
Consolidated Rock Products provides several standards to test
whether a financial projection is reliable and thus acceptable to a
court:
(1) The projection must be based on an informedjudgment;
(2) The estimate must embrace allfacts relevant to future earning capacity;
(3) The nature and condition of the debtors' properties must
be given sufficient consideration;
(4) The past earnings record must be taken into account; and
(5) The projection must take into account all circumstances bear41
42
43

See In reJartran, 44 Bankr. 331 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984).
See In re Monnier Bros., 755 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1985).
Consolidated Rock Products, 312 U.S. at 526.
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ing on whether or not the debtor's past earnings record is a reliable
criteria of its future earning power.
The five-part legal test for the acceptability of a projection used
to determine the debtor's enterprise value, as formulated by Consolidated Rock Products, continues to be the most definitive pronouncement on the subject. It should be equally instructive in evaluating
the legal sufficiency of projections underlying an LBO.
4.

Projections in LBO Litigation

Credit Managers Association of Southern California v. Federal Co.4 4
is the most significant judicial pronouncement regarding the
legal sufficiency of financial projections used in structuring an
LBO. In that case, Federal Company sold 100% of the stock in
Crescent Food Company, the LBO target, to Teeple-Reizer Acquisition Company, which was formed by Crescent's senior management to acquire the business. The acquiring company
financed its stock purchase by borrowing against the assets of
Crescent. Less than a year and a half later, Crescent succumbed
to serious financial difficulties and made an assignment for the
benefit of creditors. The assignee then sued on behalf of Crescent's creditors to set aside the LBO and to recover the consideration received by Federal for Crescent's stock.
A key issue in the fraudulent conveyance claim asserted
against Federal was whether Crescent was left with unreasonably
small capital because of the LBO. In defending against that
claim, Federal relied heavily on cash flow projections made by
General Electric Credit Corporaton (GECC), which made a loan
secured by all of Crescent's assets to fund the LBO. While
GECC predicted that Crescent would have sufficient cash flow to
take care of future obligations, the projections turned out to be
incorrect; the plaintiff challenged the projections contending that
the assumptions underlying the projections were wrong.
The court in Credit Managers phrased the question before it
as "not whether GECC's projection was correct, for it clearly was
not, but whether it was reasonable and prudent at the time it was
made." 4 5 The court found that the projections were reasonable
and prudent when made, concluding that they turned out to be
wrong because of two unforeseen events. One was the termination of a business that was one of Crescent's customers, leaving
Crescent with substantial excess inventory. The other was a
44

629 F. Supp. 175 (C.D. Cal. 1986).

45 Id. at 184 (emphasis in original).
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three month long strike against Crescent beginning shortly after
the LBO was consummated. The court found that neither of
these events was predictable when the LBO was consummated.
The lack of foreseeability of the cause of financial failure was
the basis of the court's ruling in Credit Managers that, although the
projections were wrong, Crescent nevertheless was not left with
unreasonably small capital at the time of the consummation of
the LBO. The principle derived from Credit Managers is that a
finding that there was sufficient capital may be supported by a
cash flow projection that erroneously predicted there would be
sufficient cash, so long as it is shown that the projection was prudently prepared at the time of the transaction. The court
declared:
As stated at the outset, the court's task in determining whether Crescent had sufficient capital as evidenced by cashflow projections is not to
examine what happened to Crescent, but whether the GECCprojections,
as modified, were prudent. The court finds that they were.
GECC's analysis throughout, particularly the initial analysis of
Crescent's business prospects in [two exhibits], convince the
court that Crescent was not undercapitalized at the time of the
buyout based on a review and an analysis of projected cash
flows. Based on these projections, GECC was willing to lend
substantial sums to Crescent both before and after the buyout.
Plaintiff is correct (and it is obvious) that the projections were
wrong and that Crescent had insufficient capital to withstand
the strike and the other setbacks to Crescent's business. But
the law does not require that companies be sufficiently well
capitalized to withstand any and all set backs to their business.
The requirement is only that they not be left with "unreasonably small capital" at the time of the conveyance alleged as
fraudulent. The cash flows prove that Crescent did have sufficient capital after the buyout to continue operating.4 6
Significantly, the court stated that while "20-20 hindsight"
makes clear that the cash flow projections were wrong, the occurrence of unforeseeable events subsequent to the LBO is not a basis
for finding that the company was left with unreasonably small capital
as a result of the LBO. 4 7 It also follows from the court's approach
to the issue of adequate capital, however, that a business must be
left with sufficient resources to meet all future contingencies and
eventualities to the extent they should reasonably be foreseen at the
time of the LBO transaction.
46
47

Id. at 186-87 (emphasis added).
Id. at 186-87.
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Now that the economic recession in 1990 has extended its impact into the harsh economic decline in 1991, a key issue to be faced
by the courts in LBO litigation is whether financial projections that
served as predicates for LBO transactions in the 1980s should have
made provision for a potential downturn in the economy. The basic
question is whether an earnings and cash flow projection not only
left a margin for error in the business enterprise itself, but also for
the economy in general.
5.

SEC Standards for Projections

Except for the general principles stated in Credit Managers,
case law dealing with fraudulent conveyance claims does not provide objective standards by which to evaluate the acceptability of
projections. But additional insight into the legal standard governing projections is gained from the treatment of projections
under the securities laws. For almost fifty years prior to 1980,
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had a traditional
policy against the use of earnings projections in registration
statements and other filings made with the SEC under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.48
Despite the importance of projections to investors, the benefit
from their use was considered to have been outweighed by what
was thought to be their unreliable nature.
That policy changed in 1979 when the SEC adopted a "safe
harbor" rule providing protection from liability under the federal
securities laws for projections made in SEC filings or annual reports to shareholders. 49 Under SEC Release No. 6084, projections of revenue and income, as well as other statements
concerning future economic performance, such as forecasted
capital expenditures, are deemed not to be false or misleading
under the federal securities laws if they have been (1) prepared
with "a reasonable basis" and (2) disclosed in good faith.5 ° In a
related 1988 SEC Release, the Commission issued guidelines
concerning the inclusion of projections of financial information
in filings with the SEC. 5 ' In that release, the SEC set forth the
view that projections are best understood if the underlying as48 See Hiler, The SEC and the Courts' Approach to Disclosure of Earnings Projections,
Asset Appraisals, and other Soft Information: Old Problems, Changing Views, 46 MD. L. REV.
1114 (1987).
49 See SEC Release No. 6084, effective July 30, 1979.
50 Id.
51 Guides for Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Securities Act and Exchange Act Release No. 5992, (Nov. 7, 1978).
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sumptions are disclosed, but did not adopt a rule making projections per se misleading in the absence of a disclosure of the key
assumptions. One court has ruled, however, that assumptions
underlying a projection must be disclosed "if their validity is sufficiently in doubt that a reasonably prudent investor, if he knew
of the underlying
assumptions, might be deterred from crediting
52
the forecast."

"Takeover" litigation has raised the question whether the
failure to disclose "soft" information, such as available earnings
projections, can result in liability on the part of the tendering
party for a failure to provide essential information. In Starkman v.
Marathon Oil Co. ," the court ruled that there was a duty to disclose soft information to the target's shareholders only if "the
predictions underlying the appraisal or projection are substantially certain to hold. '5 4 As stated by the court: "Our approach,
which focuses on the certainty of the data underlying the appraisal or projection, ensures that the target company's shareholders will receive all essential factual information, while
preserving the target's discretion to disclose more uncertain information without the threat of liability, provided appropriate
qualifications and explanations are made."' 55 The court was reluctant to impose a duty of disclosure with respect to the projections under consideration in the case at bar and ruled that
disclosure of this uncertain information was discretionary. It reasoned that disclosure of projections or estimated values of assets
"could well have been misleading without an accompanying
mountain of data and explanations. '"56
Another court, in Biechele v. Cedar Point, Inc. ,5 also declined
to mandate the disclosure of projections. It held that the target
of a takeover effort had no duty to disclose an appraisal or a fiveyear cash flow and earnings projection that were prepared for use
in connection with pending merger discussions. It is the notion
that projections are not inherently reliable, which has led courts
not to impose a duty of disclosure. Indeed, there is a concern
that liability could result from the disclosure of projections because of their inherently misleading nature. In light of that perception of projections, it seems clear that projections used as a
Beecher v. Able, 374 F. Supp. 341, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (footnote omitted).
772 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1985).
54 Id. at 241.
55 Id. at 242.
56 Id. at 242.
57 747 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1984).
52
53
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basis to prove the adequacy of an LBO target's capital should be
closely scrutinized and accepted as prudently prepared only if
predicated on realistic and accurate assumptions as to all foreseeable future events and circumstances.
A number of courts have held that an incorrect projection
may be a basis under certain circumstances for imposing liability
under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. In Isquith v. Middle
South Utilities, Inc. ,58 the court ruled that a projection may be tantamount to a representation of fact, resulting in the imposition of
liability if the predictive statement was false when it was made.
Specifically, the court remarked:
Most often, whether liability is imposed depends on whether
the predictive statement was "false" when it was made. The
answer to this inquiry, however, does not turn on whether the
prediction in fact proved to be wrong; instead, falsity is determined by examining the nature of the prediction-with the
emphasis on whether the prediction suggested reliability, bespoke caution, was59made in good faith, or had a sound factual
or historical basis.
Reliability for section 10(b) purposes is dependent on the existence of "a sound factual or historical basis" for the projection.6
There must also be "an informed and reasonable belief" as a predicate for a projection if it is to be found to have been prudently
made.6 In Eisenberg v. Gagnon, the court stated:
When the opinion or forecast is based on underlying materials
which on their face or under the circumstances suggest that
they cannot be relied on without further inquiry, then the failure to investigate further may "support[] an inference that
when [the defendant] expressed the opinion it had no genuine
belief that it had the information on which it could predicate
that opinion."62
Thus, the touchstones of an acceptable projection are a set of assumptions that are (1) predicated on a factual and historical basis,
(2) complete and not misleading, and (3) advanced in good faith by
those who prepared them.

E. The Valuation Process Used by FinancialExperts
Financial experts utilize various means to form opinions as

60

847 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 203-04 (citations omitted).
Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 776 (3d Cir. 1985).

61

Id.

62

Id. at 776 (citation omitted).

58
59
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to the projected revenues and net income of an enterprise for
both transactional planning and chapter 11 purposes. It is common to hear financial experts present detailed valuation analyses
supporting their opinions for pricing of particular corporate securities transactions in fraudulent conveyance litigation and to
establish enterprise value at confirmation hearings. The valuation process typically employed by financial experts involves
analysis of the particular company's historical and projected financial data, a comparison of the company or transaction to similar companies or transactions, or a review of purchase offers for
the company or similar companies during an appropriate time
frame.
One financial advisor described this deliberative process in
his testimony at a hearing to consider confirmation of a "cram
down" plan in In re Allegheny International,Inc.6" The court described the advisor's testimony regarding the process by which
he valued the shares of stock of the reorganized company to be
issued to creditors under the proposed plan of reorganization as
follows:
[The witness] testified that Smith Barney [the debtor's financial advisor], inter alia, reviewed public financial statements,
analyzed financial and operating data, prepared discounted
cash flow analyses, analyzed individual operating businesses,
considered comparable companies that were publicly traded,
considered comparable mergers and acquisitions, considered
economic and industry data, interviewed senior management,
reviewed the stock plan, and performed various other analyses. In addition, Smith Barney considered the results of the
extensive solicitation of prospective purchasers of the debtor's
businesses, which occurred in August 1988. Smith Barney had
conducted that solicitation process and thus was intimately familiar with it.
Smith Barney calculated the net income valuation by taking the debtor's projected net income for the next three years,
applying an "appropriate" predetermined multiplier, reducing
the results to present values as of March 31, 1990, and dividing by the number of shares to be issued to arrive at the price
range per share.
As part of its analysis, Smith Barney thoroughly reviewed
six other appliance companies which it considered to be comparable to the debtor. As a part of its analysis, Smith Barney
determined the appropriate multiples based on market capital63

118 Bankr. 282 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990).
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ization and based on adjusted market value. For market capitalization, the multiple was the price-earnings ratio, which
ranged from 10.2 to 13.3. For the adjusted market value, the
range of multiples for earnings before interest and taxes
(EBIT) was 5.0 to 14.4; the range of multiples for earnings
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization
(EBITDA) was 4.6 to 9.7.
[The witness] further testified that the appropriate multiple for the net income valuation, based on the multiples for
the comparable companies and other factors, was 11.5, which
was approximately the mid-point for the comparable companies. Based on the debtor issuing 45 million shares of stock,
Smith Barney determined the net income valuation by multiplying the projected earnings for 1991, 1992, and 1993 ($40.8
million, $49.6 million, and $59.5 million, respectively) by
11.5. The product of that calculation was $469.2 million for
1991, $570.4 million for 1992 and $685.4 million for 1993.
Those amounts were then reduced to their present value as of
March 31, 1990. Smith Barney thought it appropriate to apply
a discount factor because of the following factors: the debtor
was in a turnaround situation that involved certain unique
risks, the debtor had used aggressive projections of sales and
income and there were risks of failing to meet such projections, the debtor had failed to meet past projections, the risk
the market would apply to securities of an appliance manufacturer emerging from bankruptcy, the return that investors
seek for such risk, the return investors may receive in other
turnaround situations, the return on leveraged buy-outs, and
the possibility that the stock may not be well received in the
marketplace. In light of all of these special factors, Smith Barney determined that the appropriate discount rate to determine present value was 25% or 30%. When this rate was
applied, it resulted in the stock having a range of value from
$5.73 to $7.32. 64
The Committee of Equity Security Holders (Committee) opposed confirmation of the "cram down" plan in Allegheny International because it provided no distribution for the present
shareholders. The Committee contended that the new shares to be
issued to creditors were undervalued and that there was value in the
enterprise left for the shareholders based on evidence it proffered of
higher projected earnings. The Committee's expert witness criticized the valuation methods employed by the plan proponent's expert. The court nevertheless determined that the proponent's
64

Id. at 305 (footnote omitted).
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evidence on the valuation issue was credible. The proponent's witness concluded that the value of the stock to be issued to the senior
classes under the plan would range between approximately $5.73
and $7.32 per share, which resulted from applying a discount rate of
approximately twenty-five percent to determine present value. According to the proponent's expert, the debtor's sales and income
projections were too aggressive and there was risk of failing to meet
them in the future, just as the debtor failed to meet its past projections. The opponent's expert, on the other hand, used a lower discount rate of 13.4%. In rejecting that testimony, the court noted
that the opponent's expert did not fully consider the possibility that
the debtor would fail to meet its forecasts, pointing out that "[ilt is
undisputed that the debtor has consistently failed to meet its projections prior to and since the filing of bankruptcy.' '65
It is evident that the methodologies employed by financial experts in formulating projections and opinions as to value involve a
variety of complex facts, assumptions, formulae, comparisons and
other factors. Many of these factors are not susceptible to precise
answers and conclusions. Nevertheless, the court in Allegheny International was strongly influenced by the fact that the debtor's operations consistently failed to meet its own projections both before its
chapter 11 filing as well as during the pendency of the chapter 11
case. Because the debtor's previous projections lacked reliability, its
projections of higher income in the future were rejected by the
court for lack of a concrete factual basis upon which to conclude that
its future performance would improve. The projections, which the
court accepted in Allegheny International as more reliable, were the
more conservative projections offered by the proponent of a plan of
reorganization, rather than aggressive projections offered by the
shareholders' committee to oppose the confirmation of a plan that a
majority of the shareholders at large had actually accepted. It is understandable that the court opted for more conservative results,
which enabled the court to confirm a proposed plan of reorganization broadly endorsed by all equity interests. It is clear from this
discussion that the most important factors tending to gain judicial
acceptance of proffered projections are (1) consistency of the projection with the debtor's historical performance, and (2) a record of
the debtor's meeting its prior projections.
65

Id. at 306.
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CLAIMS

In General

If the projections used to support an LBO transaction turn
out to be wrong, the target of the LBO may be compelled to resort to bankruptcy to gain relief from the heavy debt burden that
its otherwise sound business enterprise cannot shoulder. The
need for bankruptcy relief in such a case is not due to ills in the
business operation; rather, it is compelled by the debt service required by the LBO financing which the cash flow of the business
cannot support.
From the filing of a chapter 11 case until confirmation of a
plan of reorganization for the debtor, enormous professional
fees are borne by the debtor estate for its own professional representation and for the representation provided by the professionals who serve official committees formed to represent creditors
and shareholders pursuant to section 1102 of the Code.66 A
debtor's management may therefore try to reach agreement
quickly with the committees on terms for the restructure of its
various LBO debt and other obligations and to emerge from
chapter 11 as soon as possible without pursuing the debtor's
fraudulent conveyance, professional malpractice and other claims
arising out of its LBO.67
The goal of achieving early confirmation of a plan of reorganization, however, may be inconsistent with the debtor's obligation to maximize its estate by vigorous pursuit of the claims
that arise out of its LBO. Although the prosecution of causes of
action that are based upon fraudulent conveyance and corporate
distribution laws may be costly in fees, protracted in duration,
and uncertain as to the outcome, a debtor has a fiduciary duty to
maximize its assets, which should include the pursuit of its claims
at least until they are ripe for settlement.
Frequently, the targets of the debtor's LBO causes of action
include major creditors whose claims arise from loans that were
made to provide the cash needed to fund the LBO and financial
advisors who helped engineer the deal. The support of the LBO
lenders, however, is usually needed by the debtor to gain the requisite acceptances of the debtor's proposed plan of reorganiza66 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (1988).

67 See the court's description of testimony given by the debtor's president in In re
Revco D.S., Inc., 118 Bankr. 464, 467 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990). He testified that
the pursuit of any litigation by the debtor to recover on its LBO claims would be a
"disaster" for the debtor's business and for "the on-going plan negotiations." Id.
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tion. For this reason, a debtor's management may prefer not to
pursue the debtor's LBO claims against its major pre-petition
lenders. An abandonment of LBO claims, however, may be injurious to the economic interests of certain classes of creditors or
shareholders. This squarely raises the question whether the
debtor has a duty to prosecute such claims either to judgment or
an arm's-length settlement, or has the legal right to abandon
such claims in its business judgment in order to achieve early
confirmation at the expense of enhancing the estate through recoveries on its LBO claims.
B.

The Duty of the Trustee or Debtor in Possession to Enforce LBO
Causes of Action

By the terms of section 541 (a) of the Code, the filing of a
chapter 11 petition for reorganization creates an "estate." 68 The
estate is comprised of all the property listed in that section, including "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property." 69 Section 541(a)(1)'s reference to "all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor in property" includes all causes of action
belonging to the debtor.7 °
A chapter 11 debtor in possession is charged with the performance of most duties of a trustee. 7 ' As the Supreme Court
stated in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub,72 "the
trustee is accountable for all property received and has the duty
to maximize the value of the estate.

'7'

Because the debtor's

causes of action existing at the petition date constitute property
of the estate, the debtor is obliged to take steps to maximize their
value through prosecution to judgment or through a fair and
arms-length settlement for the benefit of the estate. Thus, in In
re E.F. Hutton Southwest PropertiesII, Ltd. ,7 the court observed that
"[i]f an action belongs to the estate, the trustee has the power
and duty to prosecute the action for the benefit of all creditors
11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988).
Id.
70 Id.; Louisiana World Exposition v. Federal Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 233, 245 (5th
Cir. 1988); Mixon v. Anderson (In re Ozark Restaurant Equipment Co.,.Inc.), 816
F.2d 1222, 1225 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 147 (1987); American Nat'l
Bank of Austin v. Mortgageamerica Corp. (In re Mortgageamerica Corp.), 714 F.2d
1266, 1274 (5th Cir. 1983).
71 See 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a), § 1107(a) (1988).
72 471 U.S. 343 (1985).
73 Id. at 352 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 704(2), § 1106(a)(1), § 704(1)).
74 103 Bankr. 808 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989).
68
69
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and shareholders in the estate." 75
C. ProsecutorialDiscretion is Limited by Law; the Business Judgment
Rule Does Not Authorize a Decision not to Prosecute a Cause
of Action
Failing to prosecute a cause of action and allowing a statute
of limitations on the claim to expire would be tantamount to an
"abandonment" of estate property.76 The statutory and applicable case law establish that a trustee or debtor in possession does
not enjoy the power to give away valuable estate property and
justify such a waste of assets under the guise of good business
judgment. The Code expressly provides, in section 554(a), that
before the court may authorize the abandonment of any estate
property, the trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession must establish that all the statutory criteria for abandonment have been
met: that the property in question is "burdensome to the estate"
77
or that it is "of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate.
Moreover, several doctrines developed by the courts place
additional restrictions on any "discretion" that a trustee or
debtor in possession might have to abandon estate property that
even go beyond the express statutory requirements of "burdensomeness" and "worthlessness" set forth in section 554. Indeed,
the absolute statutory power of a debtor to abandon worthless
property is even limited by the courts to preclude an abandonment of environmentally infected property that poses a danger to
health or safety. 8 In In re Beker Industries Corp., the court, relying on Committee of Equity Security Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel
Corp.),8o held that the debtor could not abandon its burdensome
partnership interest in a non-debtor mining partnership, because
such an important asset could be abandoned only where it com75

Id. at 812.

A bankruptcy trustee or debtor in possession in a chapter 11 case is authorized by Code § 554(a), after notice and a hearing, to abandon property of the estate
"that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to
the estate". 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988).
77 Id. See also Morgan v. K.C. Mach. & Tool Co. (In re K.C. Machine & Tool Co.,
816 F.2d 238, 245 (6th Cir. 1987) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 554(b) (Supp. 1986) (which
authorizes court to order trustee to abandon property of the estate))).
78 Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494,
498-500, reh'g denied, 475 U.S. 1090 (1986).
79 64 Bankr. 900 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 89 Bankr. 336
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
80 Id. at 910 (citing Committee of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re
Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1983)).
76
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plied with the statutory voting, disclosure and confirmation safeguards of the chapter 11 plan confirmation process. Thus, if
resolution of an LBO cause of action would have a substantial
impact on the debtor's reorganization, that fact may require that
an abandonment be authorized only if the test for an abandonment contained in section 554 has been satisfied, and then only
pursuant to a confirmed plan of reorganization. 8 '
Perhaps the first authority to recognize the trustee's affirmative duty to prosecute all causes of action and the applicability of
abandonment concepts to causes of action is In re Moore.82
There, the court held that a chapter 7 trustee cannot abandon
estate property simply by failing to administer the asset and by
filing a "no asset" report. In Moore, the court observed that the
debtors' pre-petition "lender liability" claims against a bank and
its officers were assets of the estate that could not be abandoned
by a chapter 7 trustee without giving notice to creditors and an
opportunity for a hearing. The court was asked to rule on a motion by the bank to compel the trustee to "administer" the lender
liability claims and to compel the trustee to accept the bank's offer to purchase the claims for the sum of $5,000. Previously, the
trustee had rejected the bank's offer and determined that he was
not going to pursue the litigation as an asset of the bankruptcy
estate. The trustee argued that the "business judgment" rule allows a trustee to exercise "unfettered discretion" to abandon assets that he alone considers to be of inconsequential value and
benefit to the estate.
The court in Moore rejected the trustee's invocation of the
business judgment rule, citing (1) the language of section 554,
(2) section 704, which mandates that the trustee "collect and reduce to money the property of the estate" and "be accountable
for all property received, 8 13 and (3) the Supreme Court's une-

quivocal statement in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
Weintraub8 4 that a trustee has the "duty to maximize the value of
the estate. ' 8 5 That duty is also imposed on a chapter 11 debtor
in possession by Code section 1107.86
The standard applied by the court in Moore in reviewing the
81 See, e.g., In re Crowthers McCall Pattern, Inc., 120 Bankr. 279 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1990).
82 110 Bankr. 924 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990).
83 11 U.S.C. § 704 (1988).
84 471 U.S. 343 (1985).
85 Id. at 352.
86 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1988).

628

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 21:598

trustee's authority to abandon an asset was not the business judgment rule, but rather a higher standard. The court explained:
The test involved is a balancing of the principle of discretion
which the business judgment rule allows trustees in the management and distribution of estate property, and the duty imposed on trustees to maximize the value of the estate pursuant
to the Code. The business judgment rule should allow a
trustee discretion in balancing the costs and benefits of administering an asset of the estate. However, if consideration is
offered for a cause of action, then the cases are clear that the
trustee must take affirmative action to resolve the matter....
Although a trustee is not compelled to accept any offer to
purchase, solely because "some recovery is better than none at
all," a trustee is required to take appropriate action to liquidate
the assets of the estate. The choice of which type of action
(whether it be acceptance of the offer, a counteroffer, negotiation, open bidding, or bringing a formal motion for abandonment) belongs to the trustee within the sound exercise of the
trustee's business
judgment so long as the trusteefulfils his statu87
duties.
tory
The sound teaching of In re Moore is that the trustee or Chapter 11
debtor is duty bound to "administer" claims and causes of action of
significant potential value and must take affirmative action to maximize the estate's recovery.
There are other cases that suggest the contrary point of view
that the business judgment rule applies to shield from judicial scrutiny the debtor in possession's failure to prosecute or otherwise
maximize the value of its causes of action.8 8 In In re Revco D.S.,
Inc.,89 an equity security holder moved for authority to commence
suit derivatively on behalf of the debtors against various participants
in their December 1986 leveraged buyout. The equity holder urged
that the debtors' failure to prosecute certain state law claims as to
which the limitations period was about to expire was unjustifiable
87

In re More, 110 Bankr. 924, 928 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990) (emphasis added).

88

See, e.g., Fluharty v. Fluharty (In re Fluharty), 7 Bankr. 677 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio

1980) (holding that debtor's chapter 13 plan met the "best interest of creditors"
test under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1976) despite refusal to pursue alleged attorney
malpractice claim); In re Wilson, 94 Bankr. 886 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989) (holding that
trustee's decision to consent to abandonment of claims under certain conditions is
based on his business judgment and entitled to affirmance by court unless evidence
shows that value of claims exceeds what would be received from consent arrangement); United States ex rel. Peoples Banking Co. v. Derryberry (In re Hartley), 50
Bankr. 852 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (holding that under business judgment rule
guidelines, trustee did not breach fiduciary duty in choosing not to pursue a preference claim).
89 118 Bankr. 468 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990).
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and constituted an abandonment of estate assets subject to the standards of section 554 of the Code. The court rejected this approach
stating that "[d]ecisions on whether or not to commence litigation
rests [sic] with the business judgment of the [d]ebtors." 90 That ruling, however, related primarily to the time when the debtor would
commence suit on its LBO claims, and by a subsequent order in the
case the court directed a committee to file suit on LBO claims when
the debtor failed to do so by the time the statute of limitations was
about to run on the claims.
The court in Revco relied on In re Hartley,9 which suggests that
the trustee's decision whether or not to sue should be reviewed
under the business judgment rule. There, the bankruptcy court
held that a chapter 7 trustee's decision not to bring a certain preference action was not cause for his removal. The Hartley court opined
that the trustee's decision is "analogous to a business judgment,"
relying on In re Curlew Valley Associates.92 Interestingly, the Curlew
case involved a challenge to the business judgment of the trustee as
to the particular manner of his operating the debtor's farm, that is,
whether to "bale" hay or "cube" hay. Unlike the matter at issue in
Curlew, abandonment of estate property is not action within the ordinary course of a debtor's business, which is often tested under a
business judgment standard.9" Moreover, the business judgment
standard was applied in Curlew exclusively in terms of the trustee's
decision to accept or reject an executory contract under the predecessor to section 365 of the Code.9 4 These distinguishing factors
make Curlew a less than persuasive authority on the abandonment
issue.
Indeed, Curlew was distinguished in another context on a similar
basis. In In re Public Service Co. of New Hampshire,9 5 the court, in reviewing a proposed transaction to shift control of the debtor, held
that the business judgment standard is not applicable to test transactions out of the ordinary course of business. The court observed:
[T]he labeling of a particular proposed transaction occurring
out of the ordinary course of a reorganization debtor's busi90 Id. at 476 (citing United States ex rel. Peoples Banking Co. v. Derryberry (In re
Hartley), 50 Bankr. 852, 863 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985)).
91 50 Bankr. 852 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio W.D. 1985).
92 Id. at 863 (citing In re Curlew Valley Assocs., 14 Bankr. 506 (Bankr. D. Utah

1981)).
93 In re Beker Indus. Corp., 64 Bankr. 900, 908 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), supports the
notion that an abandonment of property is not within the ordinary course of a
debtor's business.
94 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1988).
95 90 Bankr. 575 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988).
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ness, as simply a "business judgment" by the debtor, does not
insulate the proposed transaction from a more searching view
as to its wisdom and reasonableness than was given the hayharvesting transaction in the Curlew case which occurred in the
ordinary course of the business operation there involved.9 6
In Fluharty v. Fluharty (In re Fluharty), 7 the court was asked to
rule on an objection to confirmation of a plan as not being in the
best interests of creditors because the trustee did not pursue a malpractice claim against the debtor's former attorney.9 8 The court
found that there was no proof that the debtor had a cause of action
for malpractice, and thus there was an insufficient prospect of recovery to justify incurrence of the expense of prosecution. Fluharty is
consistent with the principle, which in a case where a claim can be
stated, the trustee must take action to maximize it. By focusing on
whether there was any value in the estate's cause of action, Fluharty
is consistent with the standard of review articulated in In re Moore, in
that it recognizes that the trustee's discretion in prosecuting causes
of action is limited.
The decision in In re Wilson 9 9 also suggests that the "business
judgment" standard applies. However, Wilson does not suggest that
the debtor in possession may abandon claims in the absence of a
hearing by letting the applicable statute of limitations quietly expire.
Such inaction is outside the scope of the debtor in possession's authority under the Code. The statutory rules authorizing abandonment must be read consistently with the debtor's duty to maximize
the value of the estate's causes of action.
IV.

INTERFACE OF FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE LITIGATION WITH

THE PLAN OF REORGANIZATION

A.

In General

Fraudulent conveyance litigation, particularly of the type
that arises out of an LBO, poses various complexities in the chapter 11 context. Complexity results not only from the many factors that enter into financial analysis and conflicting expert
opinions on future projected income and present enterprise
value, but also from the mountain of paper that is usually generated in an LBO transaction involving substantial dollars. In a
typical LBO, the structure may involve several levels of public
96

Id. at 581 (emphasis in original).

97 7 Bankr. 677 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980).
98
99

Id. at 680.
94 Bankr. 886 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989).
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and private debt, with the LBO debt secured by various security
interests, and several levels of preferred and common stock equity financing, as well as a holding company-subsidiary structure.
LBO transactions are thus typically documented by a multiplicity
of lending agreements, registration statements for the offering of
debt and equity instruments publicly sold to finance the LBO,
proxy statements to solicit the votes for an LBO merger, and
complex corporate charter amendments designating the rights
and powers of the several classes of stock of the surviving
corporation.
The structuring of an LBO transaction by means of a
number of independent corporate and financial parts evidenced
by sophisticated and extensive documentation has led some legal
writers to urge that the traditional fraudulent conveyance laws
that emerged in the 16th century to protect creditors from fraudulent transfer were not intended by modem day legislatures to
apply to LBOs.' 00 Although the court, in its notable decision in
Credit Managers Association of Southern California v. Federal Co., "
suggested that fraudulent conveyance laws may not have been
intended to apply to LBOs, virtually unanimous authority has developed during the 1980s to establish that the fraudulent conveyance laws unquestionably apply to transfers and obligations that
fail the test imposed by fraudulent conveyance laws
enacted by
1 2
states and also by Congress as part of the Code.
It is also probable that the use of multiple interdependent
transactions and a multi-corporate setup will not insulate a transfer or an obligation incurred from a fraudulent conveyance attack
by separately analyzing and testing each part of the LBO. Instead the interindependent parts have been collapsed by some
courts 10

3

with the result that the LBO is viewed in light of its

economic effect and reality, namely that indebtedness is imposed
on a target company without any benefit to it while the proceeds
100 Baird and Jackson, FraudulentConveyance Law and Its ProperDomain, 38
REV. 829 (1985).

VAND.

L.

101 629 F. Supp. 175, 187-88 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
102 Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc. v. Byrne (In re Vadnais, 100 Bankr. 127 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1989)); Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 Bankr. 488 (N.D. Ill.
1988); United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986)
(affirming United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556 (M.D. Pa. 1983)),
cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987); Ohio Corrugating Co. v. Security Pacific Business
Credit, Inc. (In re Ohio Corrugating Co.), 70 Bankr. 920 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987);
Anderson Indus., Inc. v. Anderson (In re Anderson Indus. Inc.), 55 Bankr. 922
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1985).
103 See, e.g., Wieboldt, 94 Bankr. 488 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
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of the debt are paid out entirely to the shareholders of the target
company and for the fees for effecting the LBO. In the absence
of benefit to the target, a key question in LBO/fraudulent conveyance or corporate distribution litigation is whether a financial
"trigger" existed, such as insolvency of the target or the inadequacy of its capital.
The litigation of fraudulent conveyance claims arising out of
an LBO is often complex for several reasons. First, the attorneys
for the parties, who may be numerous, will be faced with a mountain of paper and witnesses, which necessarily entails lengthy pretrial document production and discovery by means of depositions. Second, financial issues, such as "insolvency" or "insufficiency of capital," involve a number of aspects that are not
governed by precise legal tests.
B.

Impediment to Confirmation

So long as fraudulent conveyance and corporate distribution
claims arising out of an LBO remain unadjudicated and not settled by the affected parties, it is difficult for a plan of reorganization to be confirmed in a chapter 11 case. A debtor in a chapter
11 case may have assets, which at a fair valuation approximate the
amount of its debts, so that under the Code's definition of "insolvency" the chapter 11 debtor will not necessarily be insolvent.' 4
If the debtor is actually insolvent due to an excess of debts above
its assets, a plan of reorganization that extinguishes the equity
interests may be confirmed over the dissent of the shareholders,
because the shares of an insolvent company are considered to be
valueless under bankruptcy law principles.'" 5 Where a debtor
was the target in a pre-bankruptcy LBO, however, the fraudulent
conveyance and corporate distribution claims that arise out of the
LBO could be of great value and themselves render the debtor
solvent.'0 6 Monetary recoveries may be effected, which could
render the debtor solvent. There are, as well, remedies other
than monetary recoveries that may be invoked if there has been a
fraudulent conveyance or fraudulently incurred obligation.
Voidable debt obligations may be set aside, or security interests
given in violation or fraudulent conveyance laws may be avoided.
U.S.C. § 101(31) (1988).
See id. at § 1129(b)(2)(C).
106 See Preliminary Report of the Examiner in In re Revco D.S., Inc., 118 Bankr.
468, 479 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990), where the examiner stated that "the remedies
for [LBO] causes of action could create a solvent estate". Id.
104 11
105
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Contractual priorities among creditors may be reallocated by application of equitable subordination principles,' 0 7 or LBO loans
might be treated as equity investments, because the proceeds of
such loans were in fact used for the purchase of stock from those
who owned the stock at the time of the LBO.
Legal claims and causes of action constitute property of the
estate. As assets, the debtor's LBO claims must be valued along
with all of its other assets to determine whether the debtor is solvent. When appropriately and fairly valued, LBO causes of action may tip the scales and result in a condition of solvency for
the debtor, thus precluding confirmation of a "cram down" plan
that would extinguish equity interests.
The non-prosecution of LBO causes of action and their
treatment by principal parties in interest in a chapter 11 case may
have a significant impact on whether and when a plan of reorganization may be confirmed. In some cases, the debtor's management will set its sights on completing the chapter 11 process as
early as possible by satisfying the creditor constituencies on the
terms of a plan of reorganization for the treatment to be accorded the various debt claims. Where the debtor was the product of an LBO, corporate management may try to work out the
terms of reorganization with the creditor groups by agreeing with
them that the debtor will not pursue its LBO causes of action,
thereby gaining the support of the creditors who were the LBO
lenders. Obviously, creditors who are being sued to set aside
their LBO collateral arrangements and debt obligations will not
readily agree to the major changes in their debt claims that are
necessary for a realistic settlement of the LBO claims against
them. A realistic settlement would require a reduction in the
amount of the LBO loan claims, which approximates the value of
the LBO claims against the LBO creditors.
The hope for a quick reorganization in chapter 11 may lead a
debtor's management not to pursue its LBO claim, and management may even oppose the efforts of others to pursue them derivatively. That is precisely what happened in Allegheny
International.'°8 The court there pointed out that very early in
that case the court itself recognized the importance of the claims
107 See Appeal of United States (In re Virtual Network Servs. Corp.), 902 F.2d
1246 (7th Cir. 1990), where the court concluded that creditor misconduct is not a
prerequisite for equitable subordination under § 510(c) of the Code. In re Virtual
Network, 902 F.2d at 1249 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1988)).
108 118 Bankr. 282 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990).
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of the debtor against a bank group that received prepetition prepayment of $400 million, for invalidation of their liens to secure
other loans approximating $220 million, for the recovery of
$500,000 of fees paid pre-petition to the bank lenders in connection with granting an extension of time for payment, for the recovery of preferential transfers to insiders, and for equitable
subordination. The court stated that very early in the case "the
court recognized that this litigation would have a crucial role in
the bargaining related to any plan of reorganization" and that
"[w]hen the debtors decided not to pursue these causes of action, this court invited the Creditors' Committee to pursue
them."' 09 Massive claims against banks and other lenders as well
as other potential defendants were also identified in the Examiner's preliminary report-filed in the Revco chapter 11 case, which
was followed by a court directive to a committee to file an LBO
action derivatively when the debtor itself failed to do so. 0
If major fraudulent conveyance claims have not been adjudicated, and thus are uncertain as to the liability and remedy when
confirmation of a plan is requested, the question is whether the
existence of the debtor's lawsuits in that condition stands in the
way of confirmation of a plan of reorganization. One approach,
which has been followed to avoid the problem, is to seek a "settlement" of the fraudulent conveyance claims against major creditor constituencies through the vehicle of a plan of
reorganization. Settlements may be effected in bankruptcy cases
only with the approval of the court, either through the process of
a court-approved compromise and settlement under Bankruptcy
Rule 9019(a)"' 1 or by means of the confirmation of a plan of reorganization which contains a settlement of the controversy. A
settlement is a permissive provision of a plan of reorganization
under section 1123(b)(3)(A) of the Code."' Specifically, section
1123(b)(3)(A) authorizes the inclusion in a plan of a settlement
"of any claim or interest belonging to the debtor or to the estate.' 1 ' Under that provision, if a fraudulent conveyance claim
is a claim "belonging to the debtor" rather than to others, then a
109 Id. at 308. In the Revco chapter 11 case, the court also directed an official
committee for unsecured creditors to file a derivative LBO lawsuit, but did not do
so until approximately 2-1/2 years after the chapter 11 case was filed, when the
statute of limitations was about to run. See In re Revco D.S., Inc., 118 Bankr. 468
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990).
110 118 Bankr. at 477-529.
111 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019(a).
112 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(A) (1988).
113

Id.
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settlement of that claim may be effected by the confirmation of
the plan of reorganization if the terms of settlement pass legal
muster.
That raises a number of crucial questions. The first is determining the legal standard that applies to test whether the settlement embodied in the plan will be approved. The second is
whether confirmation of the plan operates to preclude others,
such as individual creditors or shareholders, from pursuing the
LBO claims that have been settled or from pursuing their Code
section 502 objections interposed to the proofs of claim filed by
the creditor-defendants whose LBO liabilities would be settled
under the plan.
C. Standard For Settlement
While each creditor individually possesses fraudulent conveyance causes of action to set aside a debtor-transferor's prebankruptcy transfers or fraudulently incurred obligations, the
commencement of a bankruptcy case in essence operates to
transfer those claims to the debtor in possession or bankruptcy
trustee, if one has been appointed. A plan proponent will obviously seek to gain the support of the major creditor constituencies for the proponent's proposed plan. Because the major
creditors, who were LBO lenders, are themselves potential defendants in fraudulent conveyance litigation, any hope of gaining
their support is likely to be dependent upon reaching a settlement with them of the fraudulent conveyance claims against
them, which is then embodied in the plan.
The approach in this context would be to negotiate a meaningful reduction in the amount of the otherwise allowable claims
of the lender-creditors who are among the LBO defendants.
This could take the form of (1) elimination or a reduction in the
amount of the post-petition interest payments that may have
been received by the lenders as "adequate protection" pursuant
to section 364(d)(1)(B) of the Code 1 4 to enable a senior lien to
be created as security for post-petition financing, or (2) a reduction in the principal amount of the lenders' pre-petition LBO
loan claims.
Obviously, any settlement must be "fair and equitable" to
the parties who have an interest in the estate."' Unless the settlement produces a return or benefit for the estate that bears a
114
115

Id. at § 364(d)(1)(B).
Id. at § 1129(b).
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direct relationship to the value of the claims that the estate would
release, the settlement should not be approved. As stated in Allegheny International,a "court has discretion to approve a settlement
as part of a reorganization plan. Even so, there are limits to a
court's discretion in approving a settlement." ' 1 6 The standard
for settlement was first articulated in Protective Committee for Independent Stockholders of TMT TrailerFerny, Inc. v. Anderson," 7 which
requires that a compromise be fair and that the benefits received
by the estate be within the range of high and low values of the
causes of action to be released under the compromise." 8 It is
thus essential "to compare the terms of the compromise with the
likely rewards of litigation."19
The factors to be considered in a court's evaluation of a settlement were enumerated in In re Texaco, Inc. ,12o where the court
stated that the following factors should be given consideration:
the likelihood of success by each of the parties to the litigation,
the concrete present benefits of the settlement as compared with
the future benefits of a successful litigation, an analysis of the
extent to which the numerous beneficiaries of the litigation support or object to the proposed settlement, and the extent to
which the settlement is the product of arms length bargaining
following the vigorous development and pursuit of the claims in
the litigation so as to make them ripe for settlement.
In Allegheny International,'2 1 the court approved a settlement
of a lawsuit against a defendant bank group, under which the
banks agreed to return approximately eighteen million dollars of
post-petition interest payments they already received in cash as
"adequate protection," and also to forego further post-petition
interest payments that would have accrued thereafter at the rate
of approximately two million dollars per month until the end of
the chapter 11 case. The court mentioned several significant factors in addition to the substantial dollar proceeds generated for
the debtor estate by the proposed settlement. First, the plan at
issue provided a distribution for the three classes of equity secur116

In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 118 Bankr. 282, 309 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990).

117

390 U.S. 414 (1968).

See id; Appeals of Koch Refining Co. (In re Energy Coop., Inc.), 886 F.2d 921,
927 (7th Cir. 1989); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Holland (In re American Reserve Corp.),
841 F.2d 159, 161 (7th Cir. 1987); Martin v. Kane (In re A&C Properties), 784 F.2d
1377, 1382 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 854 (1986).
119 TMT Trailer, 390 U.S. at 425.
120 84 Bankr. 893, 902 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988).
121 In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 118 Bankr. 282 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990).
118
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ity holders, even though it was unreasonable to expect that the
litigation could gain a sufficient amount to support full payment
1 22
to creditors and a further distribution to the shareholders.
Second, while the shareholders would benefit under the proposed plan, the Equity Committee in that case was the only entity
that opposed confirmation. That opposition was interposed even
though it was in conflict with the expressed view of two of the
three classes of equity security holders represented by that com123
mittee and possibly the third represented equity class as well.

Third, the lawsuit against the banks had already been extensively
litigated in the derivative action initiated by the Creditors' Committee at the invitation of the court. 124 The litigation was conducted in a way that was "clearly adversarial." Special counsel
for the plaintiff had already requested $1.7 million in fees to conduct the litigation. It was clear that the claims in suit had been
substantially developed and litigated, that they were ripe for a
settlement, and that all major constituencies, including virtually
all of the equity interests, supported the settlement embodied in
the plan of reorganization. By contrast, however, a settlement
agreed to at the beginning stage of a major litigation may lack the
reliability that results from one reached after a period of vigorous
prosecution of the claims in suit. Finally, a settlement that does
not provide a meaningful and identifiable financial benefit to the
estate will fail the test for court approval.
Traditionally, there has been a unity of interest between
management of a corporation and its shareholders. While the
advent of bankruptcy triggers express fiduciary duties on the part
of a debtor's management to the creditors, the management continues to have fiduciary duties to the owners of the equity. Management, therefore, is subject to restraints in reaching
settlements of fraudulent conveyance and similar claims in the
chapter 11 context if the proposed settlement would leave little
or nothing for the owners of the equity. The desire of management to emerge from chapter 11 is appropriate, but the rights of
the equity interests should not be disregarded in a hasty effort to
settle LBO litigation. To do so would likely generate litigation
that may delay or stand in the way of confirmation of a plan.
Therefore, courts have recognized that the settlement of disputes
of this type on a basis that provides for all parties in interest on a
122
123
124

Id. at 314.
Id. at 313.
Id.
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fully consensual basis is the wisest course, and that a settlement
on such a basis may be the only means of achieving confirmation
of any plan of reorganization. As stated by the court, in respect
of the settlement embodied in the plan in Allegheny International,
without "settling this litigation ... it might be impossible to con-

summate any plan of reorganization."' 2 5 Indeed, the fabric of
chapter 11 is to encourage the negotiation of a fully consensual
plan rather than to seek confirmation through protracted and
costly litigation.
D.

Other Uncertainties of Litigation

Fraudulent conveyance claims are asserted in the chapter 11
context by the debtor in possession or bankruptcy trustee, if appointed, or derivatively by an official committee or other entity
authorized by the court to do so. That is, however, not the sole
manner in which fraudulent conveyance claims may be asserted
in the chapter 11 context where the potential defendant is itself
an entity that has filed a proof of claim against the estate, such as
an LBO lender. Two provisions of the Code are applicable.
First, section 502(b)(1) requires that a claim, proof of which has
been filed under section 501 of the Code, be disallowed by the
court to the extent that "such claim is unenforceable against the
debtor, and unenforceable against property of the debtor, under
any agreement or applicable law for a reason other than because
such claim is contingent or unmatured."'' 26 If and to the extent
that a proof of claim is filed with respect to an LBO debt claim,
such debt may be voidable under state fraudulent conveyance
laws, and the creditor's filed proof of claim may then be subject
to mandatory disallowance on the ground that the claim is unenforceable under applicable law within the meaning of section
502(b)(1) of the Code.
Section 502(d) contains a provision parallel to section
502(b)(1), but provides for a remedy other than permanent disallowance of the claim. Under section 502(d), if a creditor who has
filed a proof of claim has received a fraudulent transfer, the proof
of claim of the creditor-transferee must be disallowed by the
court unless the creditor-transferee
has returned the fraudulently
7
transferred property.

If there is an unadjudicated objection to a filed proof of
125 Id. at 313.
126 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1),
127 Id. at § 502(d).

§ 501 (1988).
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claim which is grounded on the creditor-claimant's receipt of or
participation in a fraudulent conveyance, the pendency of the unresolved objection may affect the goal of confirmation. The pendency of the objection may itself preclude the creditor from
voting on a proposed plan of reorganization. The reason is that
under section 1126(c) of the Code, the majority of a class of creditors required to constitute acceptance of a proposed plan by that
class is governed by the vote of the holders of "allowed" claims
who have accepted or rejected the proposed plan.' 28 Under section 502(a), a claim is deemed "allowed" unless there has been
an objection to the claim by a "party in interest,"' 29 which in a
chapter 11 case, includes any creditor or shareholder under the
inclusive language of section 1109(b) of the Code. 3 0 If there is
an unadjudicated objection filed by a creditor or shareholder, the
claim that is subject to the objection is not deemed "allowed"
and the vote on that claim does not count for determining
whether the class has accepted the plan. It is noted, however,
that Bankruptcy Rule 3018(a) permits the court temporarily to
allow a claim for voting purposes.' 3 1 But the validity of that rule
is doubtful because, in conflict with section 1126(c), it would permit a claim to be voted despite the fact that it is not an "allowed"
claim. 132

Assuming that a settlement of major LBO claims against various creditor-defendants has been effected by means of confirmation of a plan of reorganization, which releases the creditordefendants, based on a ruling by the court that the settlement has
passed the legal test for such approval, the question remains
whether a section 502 disallowance of the creditor-defendant's
claim filed against the estate may nevertheless be ordered after
confirmation of the plan in the proceeding arising from the filed
objection to the claim, which was unadjudicated at the time of
confirmation. If creditor-defendants continue to be subject to
the disallowance of their claims despite the confirmation of a
plan of reorganization, which by its terms released the creditor
Id. at § 1126(c).
Id. at § 502(a).
Id. at § 1109(b).
131 FED. R. BANKR. P. 3018.
132 See In re Gardinier, Inc., 55 Bankr. 601, 604 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985); see also In
re American Solar King Corp., 90 Bankr. 808 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988) (determining that the purpose of Rule 3018 is to foster consensus); In re Amarex, Inc., 61
Bankr. 301 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1985) (finding no persuasive authority on Rule 3018
and concluding that a court should exercise its equitable powers regarding disallowance or allowance of claims throughout the case).
128
129
130
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from liability on fraudulent conveyance claims, it is less likely that
creditor-defendants will vote in favor of a plan, because it would
not establish allowance of their claims and their clear entitlement
to receive distributions under the confirmed plan.
The key question is whether the order confirming the chapter 11 plan that contains a settlement of fraudulent conveyance
claims is entitled to resjudicataeffect and thus would constitute a
bar to the objectant's further litigation of the proceeding seeking
the disallowance under section 502 of a creditor-defendant's
proof of claim. Confirmation should not operate as such a bar to
the individual claims of the objectant. A judgment has resjudicata
effect in a later proceeding only if the issue adjudicated in both
the first and later proceedings are the same. 3 3 It is clear that the
issue with respect to the settlement of fraudulent conveyance
claims in the proceeding for confirmation of a plan of reorganization is not the same as the issue in the proceeding for determining whether a creditor-defendant's proof of claim should be
disallowed under section 502. Accordingly, the order confirming
a plan of reorganization containing a settlement should not bar
the objectant's prosecution of its objection to a claim after confirmation of the plan to the extent that it is based on the objectants'
own rights. Since fraudulent conveyance claims belong to creditors before the bankruptcy filing the question remains whether
the debtor can release the claims of the individual creditors.
The release given to the creditor-defendant under the confirmed plan should not have a greater effect than the order of
confirmation that in essence approved the settlement. In that
connection, it is noted that section 1123(b)(3) authorizes a plan
of reorganization to "provide for . . . the settlement or adjustment of any claim . . . belonging to the debtor or to the estate.' 34 The release given as part of a settlement contained in a
plan cannot release more than the claims "belonging to the
debtor or to the estate."' 1 3 5 An entity's objection to a filed proof
of claim is itself interposed by the objectant in the exercise of an
independent statutory right conferred by section 502(a) on each
party in interest. A settlement effected on the authority of section 1123(b)(3)(A) may not deal with or extinguish the independent claim that a party in interest has under section 502(a) to
object to any proof of claim.
133 50 C.J.S.Judgments §

134 11 U.S.C.
135 Id.

648 (1947).

§ 1123(b)(3) (1988).
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The substantive difference between the issue adjudicated in
a proceeding for confirmation of a plan that includes a settlement
and grants a release, on the one hand, and the merits of an objection to the claim based on a fraudulent conveyance, on the other,
is evidenced by the particular and narrow issue addressed in the
plan and settlement context. The function of the court in passing
on a settlement is not to decide the merits of the claim, but rather
to determine whether the settlement is fair and equitable. As
stated in In re Energy Cooperative, Inc.:
Our function, however, in reviewing the court's approval
of a settlement agreement is not to decide the merits of individual issues. "[lit is not the function of this court to determine the merits of a single contested issue but rather to
determine whether the plan as a whole is equitable and fair in
light of all of the issues which have been contested."' 3 6

Creditor-defendants in fraudulent conveyance litigation may be
exposed to still other risks at the plan confirmation stage. If the
holders of claims that arose in an LBO acquired their claims at discount prices that prevailed after the debtor's financial troubles became public knowledge, it is possible that a plan may be structured
by a proponent that involves separate classification for creditors
who acquired their securities at deep discount prices and provides
distributions less favorable to those classes than other creditor
37
groups.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Litigation arising in chapter 11 cases out of LBOs and other
leveraged financial transactions is complex because of uncertainty as to resolution of the financial issues posed by such dis136 886 F.2d 921, 927, n.6 (7th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). See Huddleston v.
Nelson Bunker Hunt Trust Estate, 117 Bankr. 231 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990) (court
affirmed an order of confirmation granted by the bankruptcy court of a chapter 11
plan of reorganization that settled and released derivative claims against bank lenders). Derivative claims are "property of the estate," which may be released if the
terms of settlement are fair and equitable. Derivative claims are distinguishable
from individual or class claims. The latter do not constitute property of the estate,
but are owned by individual injured parties. The court recognized in the Nelson
Bunker Hunt case that non-derivative claims are not barred by a debtor's settlement
with the defendants in which the individual claimants have not joined.
'37 See In re U.S. Truck Co., 800 F.2d 581, 583-87 (6th Cir. 1986) (discussing
classification of creditors under the Code); In re Four Seasons Nursing Centers of
Am., Inc., 472 F.2d 747, 750 (10th Cir. 1973) (holding that individuals who
purchased shares after filing of petition for reorganization were not entitled to participate equally with prior shareholder); In re Aztec, 19 B.C.D. 1826 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 1989).
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putes and the extensive documentation of such transactions
leading to protracted discovery, motion practice, trials and appeals. Such litigation is costly, protracted and uncertain in its
outcome. Fraudulent conveyance and similar litigation has a significant impact on the chapter 11 confirmation process. The valuation of LBO causes of action is an important issue for
adjudication when confirmation of a cram down plan extinguishing the equity interests is sought. Uncertainty also exists as to
whether a particular settlement of fraudulent conveyance litigation will qualify for court approval and, even if it does, whether
confirmation of such a plan will provide a safe harbor to the creditor-defendants from the post-confirmation adjudication of objections to their filed proofs of claim. The only sure answer to
the elimination of delay and risks to confirmation as well as to
post-confirmation litigation is a plan that gains the support of
every major creditor and shareholder constituency.

